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[INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO]
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Giovanna Shay*
In recent years, commentators have paid increasing attention to male
sexual victimization and same-sex intimate partner violence. Law professor
Bennett Capers has published an article entitled Real Rape Too, focusing on
male rape;1 human rights activists have written about how the human rights
community has tended to equate gender violence with violence against
women;2 and the national media has reported on the experiences of male
rape victims.3 At the same time, the LGBTQ rights movement has called
for more awareness regarding intimate partner violence in same-sex
relationships.4
In this symposium piece, I want to reflect on our current moment of
transition to more gender-inclusive notions of sexual and intimate partner
violence. I’m going to highlight three developments in 2012 that
represented that movement: the FBI’s adoption of a gender-neutral
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. Thanks to Kelly
Strader and the Southwestern Law Review for the invitation to participate in this symposium; to
Kelly, Kim S. Buchanan, Erin Buzuvis, Bennett Capers, Jennifer Levi, and Sudha Setty for helpful
comments on earlier drafts; and to James Ackley, Elliott Hibbler, and Pat Newcombe for fine
research assistance.
1. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (2011).
2. Lara Stemple, Male Rape and Human Rights, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 605-606 (2009).
3. Roni Caryn Rabin, Men Struggle for Rape Awareness, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/health/as-victims-men-struggle-for-rapeawareness.html.
4. NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL,
TRANSGENDER, QUEER AND HIV-AFFECTED INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (2011), available at
http://www.avp.org/storage/documents/Reports/2012_NCAVP_2011_IPV_Report.pdf. See also
Tara R. Pfeifer, Out of the Shadows: The Positive Impact of Lawrence v. Texas on Victims of
Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1251, 1252-1253 (2005); Krisana M.
Hodges, Trouble in Paradise: Barriers to Addressing Domestic Violence in Lesbian Relationships,
9 L. & SEXUALITY 311, 312-313 (1999-2000). See also Tara R. Pfeifer, Out of the Shadows: The
Positive Impact of Lawrence v. Texas on Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 109 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 1251, 1252-1253 (2005).
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definition of rape; the debate regarding the reauthorization of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA); and the promulgation of new Department of
Justice (DOJ) regulations under the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003
(PREA).
The first important development that I want to consider occurred early
in 2012, when the FBI changed its definition of rape to include male
victims.5 Until 2012, the FBI definition tracked the traditional definition of
rape, and was gendered: it criminalized “carnal knowledge of a female
forcibly and against her will.”6 The vast majority of American jurisdictions
have adopted rape statutes that are (in large measure) gender-neutral,7
although gendered rape statutes are still on the books in some jurisdictions.8
5. Charlie Savage, U.S. to Expand Its Definition of Rape in Statistics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2012. The new FBI definition of rape is: “the penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or
anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without
the consent of the victim.” See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Announces
Revisions to the Uniform Crime Report’s Definition of Rape, (Jan. 6, 2012),
http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/attorney-general-eric-holder-announcesrevisions-to-the-uniform-crime-reports-definition-of-rape.
6. Stephanie Hallett, Definition of Rape Officially Changed, Impacts Men As Well As
Women, HUFF POST WOMEN, Jan. 6, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephaniehallett/definition-of-rape_b_1190633.html. Accord John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still
Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and
Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1083 (2011); See also Elizabeth J.
Kramer, When Men Are Victims: Applying Rape Shield Laws to Male Same-Sex Rape, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 293, 301-302 (1998) (noting that because rape statutes were not gender neutral, rape
shield laws also failed to protect male victims of sexual assault).
7. See Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, The Paradox of Statutory Rape,
87 IND. L.J. 505, 516 & n.88 (2012) (“today statutory rape statutes are gender-neutral with respect
to both the class of perpetrators and the class of victims in almost all, if not all, states”); Philip
N.S. Rumney, In Defence of Gender Neutrality Within Rape, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 481,
n.33 (2007) (stating that all but five states had adopted gender-neutral rape statutes as of 2007);
Deborah Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, n.152 (1997)
(reporting in 1997 that forty-one states had gender-neutral statutes).
8. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (defining first-degree rape in
part as opposite-sex intercourse, providing: “A person commits the crime of rape in the first
degree if he or she engages in intercourse with a member of the opposite sex by forcible
compulsion . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., Criminal Law § 3-303 (a)(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (defining
rape in the first degree in part by reference to female anatomy: “a person may not engage in
vaginal intercourse with another by force”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-71 (West 2011) (defining
the crime of assault with intent to ravish as “assault with intent to forcibly ravish any female of
previous chaste character.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(2) (2011) (defining first-degree rape in
part by reference to a female anatomy that “A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if the
person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person by force and against the will of the
other person.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (LexisNexis 2009) (stating that a person commits
rape when that person “knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse with a member of the
opposite sex” under certain circumstances). Idaho criminalizes a separate crime of “male rape,”
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6108 (Supp. 2012) (defined as “the penetration, however, slight, of the
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Nonetheless, until the FBI made this change, male rape victims did not
count in federal crime statistics.9 Even if state law rape definitions
encompassed male victims, those cases simply were not reported in the
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), which were based on the FBI definition—
the ultimate erasure.10 At a minimum, the change in the FBI statistics
signals important recognition of the existence of male victims, and will
assist with more accurate reporting.11
The second significant episode of 2012 was resolved as this article was
being written—it was the Congressional debate regarding the
reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). In April
2012, the Senate passed a reauthorization of VAWA providing funding for
projects to serve LGBT communities and prohibiting VAWA-funded
services from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity.12
Republicans in the House stripped language referring
specifically to gay and transgender victims from the bill.13 Although even

oral or anal opening of another male” in specified circumstances). See also Courtney O’Donnell,
Swedish Judge Rules Man Not Guilty of Attempted Rape of Trans Woman Because She Has No
Vagina, HUFF POST GAY VOICES, July 6, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/courtneyodonnell/sweden-transgender-rape_b_1647981.html.
9. Savage, supra note 5.
10. Id.
11. But see Brenda V. Smith, Uncomfortable Places, Close Spaces: Female Correctional
Workers’ Sexual Interactions with Men and Boys in Custody, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1690, 1719
(2012) (arguing that the new federal definition of rape—”penetration . . . of the vagina or anus
with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person” – may
recognize men as rape victims, but still does not encompass women as perpetrators, because of the
penetration requirement).
12. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012, S. 1925, 112th Cong. (2011-12)
(the Senate bill would have expanded the definition of “underserved populations” to include
categories of sexual orientation and gender identity; would have prohibited service providers from
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity; and would have funded
expansion of programs for those who have not received services because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2011, Report of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, S. 1925, 112th (2011) (noting that “programs which primarily
serve gay men . . . have been denied access to [VAWA] funding in the past because they do not
predominantly address violence against women.”) See Jonathan Weisman, Senate Votes to
Reauthorize Domestic Violence Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/04/27/us/politics/senate-votes-to-renew-violence-against-women-act.html.
13. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012, H.R. 4970, 112th Cong. (2012).
David Grant, House Passes Violence Against Women Act, Grudgingly, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, May 16, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2012/0516/Housepasses-Violence-Against-Women-Act-grudgingly; Jennifer Bendery & Laura Bassett, House
Passes Violence Against Women Act that Leaves Out LGBT, Immigrant Protections, HUFFINGTON
POST, May 16, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/16/house-passes-violence-againstwomen-act_n_1522524.html; Russell Berman, House, Senate Can’t Agree on Violence Against
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some House Republicans called on their colleagues to send a more inclusive
bill to the White House, the 112th Congress ended without the issue being
resolved.14 Shortly before this article went to press, the 113th Congress
passed an LGBT-inclusive version of VAWA, which President Obama
signed into law in March 2013.15
The third important development that I’d like to highlight is the
movement to address sexual violence in prison, including violence against
men and boys. This movement has produced the Prison Rape Elimination
Act of 2003 (PREA),16 under which new federal regulations were
promulgated in May 2012.17 These new regulations—the first national
standards ever to address prison sexual violence18—cover men and boys as
well as women and girls. They are more protective of female prisoners than
male inmates in some respects. Most notably, the new PREA regulations
ban cross-gender pat searches of adult women but not adult men.19
However, the regulations are largely gender-neutral, and the process that
produced them involved a lot of public attention to male rape survivors’
stories, including from advocacy groups like Just Detention International
(JDI)20 and in the report of the National Prison Rape Elimination
Commission.21

Women Act, THE HILL, June 23, 2012, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/234409-house-gopsenate-dems-cant-agree-on-violence-against-women-act.
14. Jennifer Bendery, Violence Against Women Act: John Boehner, Eric Cantor Pressured
by Republicans to Act, HUFF POST POLITICS, Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2012/12/11/violence-against-women-act-john-boehner-eric-cantor_n_2278549.html.
15. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54
(2013) (including sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories in the nondiscrimination provision and in the definition of “under-served” populations). See Jackie Calmes,
Obama Signs Expanded Anti-Violence Law, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2013 (explaining that the new
version of VAWA extended protections to gay and transgender victims of domestic violence).
16. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15606(d)(1), (e)(1) (West 2005).
17. Prison Rape Elimination Act National Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,197 (June 20, 2012)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115). See David Kaiser & Lovisa Stannow, Prison Rape: Obama’s
Program to Stop It, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/11/prison-rape-obamas-program-stop-it/.
18. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Releases Final Rule to Prevent, Detect and
Respond to Prison Rape, May 17, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-ag-635.html.
19. 28 C.F.R. § 115.15 (b) (2012) (providing that, by certain phased-in deadlines, “the
facility shall not permit cross-gender patdown searches of female inmates, absent exigent
circumstances.”).
20. See Survivor Testimony, JUST DET. INT’L, http://www.justdetention.org/en/survivor_
testimony.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
21. NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION
COMMISSION REPORT (2009).
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PREA requires state corrections systems to report data on prison sexual
violence, and this is important for another reason: as Kim Shayo Buchanan
recently has pointed out, the statistics undermine “conventional gender
expectations.”22 As Buchanan emphasizes, female staff are the alleged
perpetrators in the majority of male prisoners’ reports of sexual abuse,23 and
women prisoners report more abuse by other female inmates than by
officers of either gender.24
I submit that these three developments—the change in the FBI
definition of rape, the debate over VAWA reauthorization, and the
promulgation of the new PREA regulations—mark 2012 as a year in which
we moved towards more gender-inclusive conceptions of rape and intimate
partner violence. Twenty-five years ago, reformers’ project was to “expose
fully the sexism of the law,”25 and stories of institutionalized misogyny and
male power dramatized some of the most egregious injustices. Today
“governance feminism” has established itself as a prevailing criminal
justice paradigm,26 and feminist law reforms, albeit imperfect and
incomplete,27 have achieved important gains. Today’s reform efforts both
22. Kim S. Buchanan, Engendering Rape, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1630, 1639 (2012). See also
Smith, supra note 11 (“One of the most surprising findings of the [BJS] research [after PREA]
was the widespread involvement of female correctional staff in sexual incidents—both with adult
and juvenile males in custody.”).
23. Buchanan, supra note 22, at 1638-39 (“In men’s facilities, women generally constitute a
minority of correctional staff, yet survey respondents consistently report much higher rates of
sexual victimization by women staff than by fellow inmates. More than two-thirds of male
victims of staff sexual abuse say that their perpetrators were exclusively women.”). Buchanan
also writes, “in spite of stereotypical expectations, correctional authorities investigating
allegations of prison rape have often found more ‘substantiated’ cases involving female than male
staff.” Id. at 1672. See also Paul Cook, The Dynamics of Sexual Abuse of Male Juveniles by
Female Correctional Officers—Myth and Fact, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 1326, 1333 (2012) (writing
that a 2008-2009 Bureau of Justice Statistics study demonstrated that “[i]n the juvenile setting, the
males abused by staff were abused almost exclusively by female staff.”).
24. Buchanan, supra note 22, at 1669.
25. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1090 (1986).
26. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS 20-22 (2006) (providing a critical description of
“governance feminism,” stating that “feminism rules. Governance feminism. Not only that, it
wants to rule. It has a will to power.”).
27. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, & Improper
Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1468 (2003)
(describing how, despite gains by rape law reformers in trying to abolish marital rape exemptions,
about twenty-four states still have some kind of marital immunity); See Decker & Baroni, supra
note 6; Emily J. Sack, Is Domestic Violence A Crime?: Intimate Partner Rape as Allegory, 24 ST.
JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 564 (2010) (“Continuing unequal treatment of marital rape is
directly traceable to the historically unequal treatment of women, and married women in
particular.”). See also Jessica Klarfeld, A Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape Law’s Failure to
Keep Up with Domestic Violence Law, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1819 (2012) (describing how
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build on and question prior feminist reforms, as we move toward more
gender-inclusive approaches to these issues.
It’s no surprise that dominant rape and domestic violence narratives28
have been about men raping and abusing women. Cases fitting that
narrative are still the vast majority of reported cases,29 although we might
ask whether that reflects in part a lack of reporting on behalf of male
victims.30 Some have suggested that more victims of same-sex rape and
intimate partner violence will come forward after Lawrence v. Texas, now
that there is no longer criminal stigma attached to same-sex sexuality.31
Our dominant narratives are not solely the product of empirical
realities, however. Legal theorists in the schools of legal realism, cultural
studies, cultural cognition, and law and society have long argued that law—
along with legal claims and legal arguments—can “construct” social
reality.32 Law and society scholars Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns
marital rape is still—despite law reforms—not punished as severely as non-marital rape, and
suggesting that states should implement reforms similar to those enacted in the domestic violence
arena).
28. Others have written of “dominant narratives” of rape and domestic violence law, making
different points about race and gender privilege. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, A “Neo-Feminist”
Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law Reform, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 583, 608
(2012) (“[C]riminal law’s embedded narratives and institutional structure make it a poor
mechanism for dismantling hierarchy and male domination.”); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and
the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 616 (2009) (quoting Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race
& Representation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of
Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 869, 890 (1996)).
29. According to the National Crime Victimization Survey, 1.3 per 1000 women reported
that they were sexually assaulted in 2010, compared with 0.1 per 1000 men. JENNIFER L.
TRUMAN, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2009-10 (2011).
30. Capers, supra note 1, at 1273-74 (writing that the reasons for underreporting of rape
among men include “the taint of homophobia; the fear of appearing weak and hence not
masculine; and definitional and perceptual issues.”).
31. Id. at 1262 (“[P]rior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas
invalidating sodomy laws, those who came forward as rape victims risked being prosecuted as
criminals in many states.”); Pfeifer, supra note 4. Scholars have made a similar point about
opposite-sex rape prosecutions following the abandonment or desuetude of laws criminalizing
consensual heterosexual sex. See Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1 (1998)
(arguing that traditional rape law doctrine, which may be viewed as misogynist, is better
understood when we consider that “[w]e inherited the rape crime from a culture in which rape was
only one of two basic categories of heterosexual offenses. The other category of offenses
consisted of consensual sexual intercourse outside of marriage—fornication and adultery—in
which the man and woman were accomplices.”); Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (describing how “until the mid-twentieth century, marriage played an
important role in the adjudication, enforcement, and even definition of the crime of seduction.”).
32. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 948
(1995). See Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law & Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 839,
848-56 (2011) (describing schools of critical legal studies, law and feminism, and law and society,
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explain, “[w]e come . . . to see ourselves as law sees us.”33 As we all know,
feminist law reform efforts of the latter half of the twentieth century
focused on male violence against women,34 and were rooted in dominance
feminism, specifically the work of giants such as Catharine MacKinnon.35
It’s not due to numbers alone that we see rape as a tool of male oppression
of women.
The “dominant narratives” of rape and domestic violence law have
been reinforced by the efforts of reformers who brought claims predicated
on violence against women as a type of sex discrimination. Linda Kelly has
written of the example of the 1984 case Thurman v. City of Torrington,36
which I discuss regularly with my Gender & Criminal Law students.
Tracey Thurman famously sued the town for repeatedly failing to enforce
orders of protection against her abusive husband.37 The claim in Thurman
was crafted as a gender discrimination claim, alleging that the City had
failed to protect “women who have complained of being abused by their
husbands . . . .”38 Accordingly, Ms. Thurman’s equal protection claim
received an intermediate level of scrutiny.39 As Professor Kelly has argued,
although this equal protection argument in Thurman garnered a more

and how these schools describe “law as constitutive of culture and social relations.”). Mautner
quotes Pierre Bourieu and Richard Terdiman: “law is the quintessential form of the symbolic
power of naming that creates the thing named . . . .” Id. at 850 (quoting Pierre Bourdieu &
Richard Terdiman, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 805, 838 (1987)). See also Dan Kahan, Culture, Cognition and Consent: Who Perceives
What, and Why, in Acquaintance Rape Cases, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 729, 799 (2010) (“The only
certain effect of any sort of reform is expressive. Laws have meanings as well as consequences.”).
33. Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, The Cultural Lives of Law, in AUSTIN SARAT &
THOMAS R. KEARNS, ED. LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE (1998).
34. Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977).
35. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 635, 650-51 (1983) (“To be rapable,
a position which is social not biological, defines what a woman is.”). See also Linda Kelly,
Disabusing the Definition of Domestic Abuse: How Women Batter Men and the Role of the
Feminist State, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 791, 817-18 (2003) (discussing the role of feminist theory,
and in particular the work of Catharine MacKinnon, in shaping our dominant understanding of
domestic violence).
36. Kelly, supra note 35, at 832-36 (discussing Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp.
1521 (D. Conn. 1984)).
37. Kelly, supra note 35, at 832 (“The critical 1984 decision in Thurman v. City of
Torrington set the tone, adding the judicial branch to the increasingly pervasive number of
institutions that ignore female violence.”).
38. 595 F. Supp. at 1527.
39. Id.
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plaintiff-friendly legal standard, it also wholly equated domestic violence
with men’s abuse of women.40
Legal claims casting sexual and intimate partner violence as sex
discrimination against women continue to appear in domestic violence
advocacy,41 as well as in Title IX proceedings42 and international human
rights law,43 eclipsing victimization of men. Although the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA)44 is gender neutral in its language, its title
40. Kelly, supra note 35, at 832-36 (2003) (Professor Kelly criticizes the equal protection
rationale of Thurman, writing that, in employing a “gender-related” equal protection standard, the
court “fail[ed] to leave room for the possibility of female violence,” and argues that, “[b]y
tailoring the standard exclusively to battered women, the courts have further reinforced the belief
that only women can be the victims of domestic violence.”). See also Ryan Elias Newby, Evil
Women and Innocent Victims: The Effect of Gender on California Sentences for Domestic
Homicide, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 113 (2011) (comparing sentences for men and women
convicted of spousal homicide in California and concluding that women were more often subject
to weapons enhancements, but also more likely to be convicted of lesser included offenses if they
could demonstrate their spouse’s prior history of violence).
41. See Erica Franklin, When Domestic Violence and Sex-Based Discrimination Collide:
Civil Rights Approaches to Combating Domestic Violence and its Aftermath, 4 DEPAUL J. for
Social Justice 335 (2011) (advocating using claims of sex-based discrimination under the equal
protection clause, Title VII, and the Fair Housing Act to help female survivors of heterosexual
domestic violence, although recognizing that intimate partner violence occurs in same-sex
relationships as well, and that men can be victims). The author explains, “with some exceptions,
the civil rights challenges discussed in this Comment apply by their very nature only to female
survivors of domestic violence—an inevitable limitation of the approach for which this Comment
advocates.” Id. at 339. See also Niji Jain, Engendering Fairness in Domestic Violence Arrests:
Improving Police Accountability Through the Equal Protection Clause, 60 EMORY L.J. 1011,
1040 (2011) (developing an equal protection argument to address police non-enforcement of
restraining orders by targeting police stereotypes about women).
42. See, e.g., Wendy Murphy, Using Title IX’s “Prompt and Equitable” Hearing
Requirement to Force Schools to Provide Fair Judicial Proceedings to Redress Sexual Assault on
Campus, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1007, 1014 (2006) (“Women victims of serious or pervasive
sexual and gender harassment had to jump through . . . burdensome hurdles . . . while students
reporting even a single verbal slur regarding their race or sexual orientation received immediate
and meaningful intervention.”); see also Erin Buzuvis, Court Dismisses Claims in Bully-Suicide
Case, Title IX Blog (Jan. 9, 2012, 12:04 PM), http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2012/01/courtdismisses-claims-in-bully-suicide.html (discussing the decision, Estate of Carmichael v.
Galbraith, No. 3:11–CV–0622–D, 2012 WL 13568 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2012), in which the court
rejected claims by the survivors of a teen who committed suicide after being bullied, concluding
that the decedent had not been targeted “because of sex,” as required by Title IX, despite his
tormentors’ use of homophobic slurs such as “fag, queer, homo, and douche.”).
43. See Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, or What’s Wrong With Women’s Rights, 20
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 98, 107 (2011) (“The drafters of CEDAW sought to situate women’s
rights as a preeminent international concern. Women throughout the world confronted sexist
institutions, and the drafters’ goals centered on utilizing international human rights law to
ameliorate these harms.”) (footnote omitted).
44. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in
42 U.S.C. §§ 13981-14045 (2006)).
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demonstrates its animating focus.45 Professor Sally Goldfarb writes that the
bill’s sponsors were “deeply immersed in an awareness that violence
against women is one of the principal ways in which male dominance and
female subordination are expressed and perpetuated.”46 It is for this reason
that Professor Capers has described VAWA as an effort to “gender
crime.”47
These dominant, gendered narratives of rape and domestic violence
have imposed certain costs. Some argue that they have reinforced the
notion that to be raped or battered is, by definition, a woman’s experience,48
contributing to male survivors’ feelings of shame and isolation.49 Others
have noted these stories obscure intimate partner violence in LGBT
relationships.50
An increasing number of theorists have proposed different ways of
conceptualizing intimate violence. Angela Harris and Kim Buchanan have
employed the term “gender violence,” emphasizing that violent acts affirm
45. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Viewing the Violence Against Women Act Through the Lenses of
Feminist Legal Theory, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 198, 201 (2010) (“Despite the emphasis on
violence against women in the statute’s title and legislative history, the civil rights section
furnished a claim to anyone, male or female, who was a victim of a crime of violence motivated
by gender.”).
46. Id. at 200.
47. Capers, supra note 1, at 1295.
48. See Smith, supra note 11, at 1719 (“The law reinforces the narrative that women can
only be passive victims of rape by virtue of their gender.”); cf. MICHAEL SCARCE, MALE ON
MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMA AND SHAME 8-9 (1997) (“The general belief persists
that either men cannot be raped, or if they are, so few men are raped that it becomes a freak
occurrence.”).
49. Scarce, supra note 48, at 9-10 (“[W]hen men are raped by other men, society tends to
silence and erase them rather than acknowledge the vulnerability of masculinity and manhood.”);
Smith, supra note 11, at 1723 (“In female-on-male sexual assault cases, men are disbelieved,
mocked, or thought to have initiated, encouraged, or enjoyed the assault in some manner. This
contributes to men’s reluctance to report forced or coerced sex, especially by women.”) (footnote
omitted).
50. Commentators mark the 1983 Lesbian Task Force of the National Coalition of Domestic
Violence as the first public, national recognition of the problem of battering in LGBT
relationships. Pamela M. Jablow, Note, Victims of Abuse and Discrimination: Protecting Battered
Homosexuals Under Domestic Violence Legislation, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1101 (2000).
Beginning in the 1990s, increasing numbers of legal commentators wrote about abuse in same sex
relationships, the lack of legal protections for gays and lesbians, and the need for training of law
enforcement personnel. See Ruthann Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law &
Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567, 568 (1990); Nancy E. Murphy, Note,
Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV.
335, 339 (1995); Kathleen Finley Duthu, Perspective, Why Doesn’t Anyone Talk About Gay &
Lesbian Domestic Violence, 18 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 23, 24 (1996); Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse That
Dare Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence in
Massachusetts, 28 N. ENG. L. REV. 273, 274-275 (1993).
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the offender’s normative masculinity, and can be perpetrated on men as
well as women.51 Others, most famously Janet Halley, have called for the
left to “take a break from feminism,”52 in order to work outside what Halley
describes as an “M>F” anti-subordination framework.53 Halley asks
whether feminism has endowed women with the ability to “wield[] the
moral code of good sex,” and whether this moralism is in fact “bad for
women.”54
By contrast, other commentators have reaffirmed that they are
intentionally working from a “violence against women” perspective, and
argue that domestic violence remains rooted primarily in male dominance.55
Some assert that men are trying to “co-opt” the label of “victim.”56

51. Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777,
780 (2000) (using the term “gender violence” to describe “violent acts committed by men . . . [as
a means of] demonstrating the perpetrator’s manhood,” and arguing that “men as well as women
may be its victims.”); Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a
Prison Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 17-18 (2011); Kim S. Buchanan, Our Prisons,
Ourselves: Race, Gender & the Rule of Law, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 37 (2010) (explaining
that in both prison and the free world, men “use same-sex sexual abuse and harassment to reaffirm
that they are straight and manly and that their victims deserve abuse and contempt for being
effeminate or gay”); Kim S. Buchanan, E-race-ing Gender: The Racial Construction of Prison
Rape, in MULTIDIMENSIONAL MASCULINITIES AND LAW: FEMINIST AND CRITICAL RACE
APPROACHES 187, 188-89 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012); Christopher N.
Kendall, Gay Male Pornography and Sexual Violence: A Sex Equality Perspective on Gay Male
Rape and Partner Abuse, 49 MCGILL L.J. 877, 918 (2004) (arguing that gay male pornography
can reinforce notions of masculinity that rely on violence and that “[g]ay men who batter and
abuse their partners have specific ideas about masculinity and what it means to be ‘male.’”).
52. HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 26, at 283; Janet Halley, writing sub nom Ian
Halley, Queer Theory by Men, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE
ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 9, 9 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds.,
2009); see also Marc Spindelman, Feminism Without Feminism, 9 ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP: LEGAL FEMINISM NOW, ARTICLE 8 (2011), available at http://www.bepress.com/
ils/vol9/iss2/art8.
53. Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 52, at 10 (“[T]o be a feminism in the United
States today, a position must posit some kind of subordination as between M and F.”).
54. HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 26, at 356 (Halley asks us to reimagine a divorce
case in which the wife has alleged coerced bondage by the husband, asking: “Can feminism read
the case as male subordination and female domination—and still as bad for women?”).
55. See Kathleen J. Ferraro, Woman Battering: More Than A Family Problem, in WOMEN,
CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 135, 136-37 (Claire M. Renzetti & Lynne Goodstein eds., 2009)
(“The violence against women perspective insists that patriarchy, sexism, and gender inequality
are the fundamental conditions under which violence against female partners develops. . . . This
chapter is written from the violence against women perspective and uses the term ‘woman
battering.’”); see also Hodges, supra note 4, at 331 nn.112-13 (quoting and discussing Demie
Kurz, Violence Against Women or Family Violence? Current Debates and Future Directions, in
GENDER VIOLENCE: INTER-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 443, 447 (Laura L. O’Toole et al. eds.,
1997); MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 334 (3d ed. 2013)

5.SHAY.ARTICLE.MACRO.6.6.13 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

[ I N C LU DI NG BU T NO T LI MIT ED TO]

11/20/2013 12:37 PM

811

Against the backdrop of this debate, the prison anti-sexual violence
movement may provide a model of a more gender-inclusive approach to
reform. The movement that produced the Prison Rape Elimination Act
(“PREA”) was led in part by male survivors,57 and informed from the start
by awareness of male rape victims.58 Passage of the initial PREA
legislation in 2003 was not as much a mainstream gay rights movement
victory as it was the product of a counter-intuitive alliance including
evangelical Christian elements.59 However, the final Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) regulations promulgated under the statute in 2012 were shaped by
contributions from free-world LGBT advocacy groups,60 which included
many ground-breaking provisions affecting LGBT prisoners.61
The movement that produced PREA is remarkable among law reform
movements for its focus on male rape survivors. This is illustrated by the
rape survivors’ testimony on the web site for Just Detention International
(“JDI” formerly STOP Prisoner Rape) one of the organizations that was

(noting that “[s]ome feminists prefer to use the term ‘woman abuse’ or ‘male battering of women’
to highlight the fact that women are most often the victims of the violence.”).
56. Patricia Novotny, Rape Victims in the (Gender) Neutral Zones: The Assimilation of
Resistance, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 743, 745, 750 (2003) (arguing that “male co-optation of
the victim category” may represent a “backlash” against feminist law reform).
57. See Valerie Jenness & Michael Smyth, The Passage and Implementation of the Prison
Rape Elimination Act: Legal Endogeneity and the Uncertain Road From Symbolic Law to
Instrumental Effects, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 489, 494, 501 (2011) (describing multiple
constituencies that contributed to the movement to eliminate prison rape, including the
organization Stop Prisoner Rape, and explaining the importance of the testimonials of prison rape
survivors).
58. See Capers, supra note 1, at 1267 (finding that systemic efforts to gather data on male
rape resulted from Congress’ passage of the “mostly hortatory” PREA) (quoting Alice Ristroph,
Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 175 (2006)); see also Terry A. Kupers,
M.D., M.S.P., The Role of Misogyny and Homophobia in Prison Sexual Abuse, 18 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 108-109 (2010).
59. Jenness & Smyth, supra note 57, at 503 (describing the role of Prison Fellowship
Ministries in the passage of PREA and explaining its involvement in part based on the fact that
“the modern evangelical sector has long been committed to controlling sexual behavior and
sexuality—especially when it involves same-sex participants.”).
60. Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 365-66 (2009)
(describing contributions of LGBT advocacy groups to the regulations proposed to the DOJ by the
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission).
61. National Standards To Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, Final Rule, 77 Fed.
Reg. 119, 37109-110 (June 20, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 115), available at
http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/2012-12427.pdf
(describing
provisions affecting LGBT inmates and Gender Non-Conforming Inmates, including training for
staff, no searches permitted solely to determine genital status; no segregated units for LGBT
inmates without a consent decree, judgment, or settlement; requirement that housing for
transgender prisoners be determined on a case-by-case basis).
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instrumental in getting PREA enacted.62 JDI features stories from men and
women, including gay and transgender prisoners. One JDI campaign on
social media features two pictures of the same young man. In the first
photo, he is wearing street clothes and the caption reads, “would you joke
around about this man being raped?” In the second, he appears in a prison
uniform, and the caption reads, “how about now?”63
The more gender-inclusive nature of the movement to end prison
sexual violence may be attributable in large part to the demographics of the
incarcerated population,64 but also may be reinforced by the nature of
available legal claims. Although advocates for women prisoners and for
male victims of prison rape often worked separately due to the stateenforced sex segregation of corrections institutions, the Eighth Amendment
provides a single legal standard that applies to all sentenced prisoners.65
Unlike equal protection or statutory sex discrimination provisions, the
Eighth Amendment is not dependent on protected categories or
comparators.66 Nor is there any ambiguity about whether abuse of gay or
transgender prisoners is covered under the Eighth Amendment.67 In fact,
the prevailing Eighth Amendment standard for failure to protect cases was
set in the case of a transgender woman housed in a male facility in Farmer
v. Brennan.68 The Farmer standard may be very difficult to meet,69 but it
does not require a demonstration of sex discrimination.
This does not mean that courts are even-handed in their application of
legal standards to prisoners’ cases. Some are less receptive to men’s claims
of sexual abuse than to similar claims by women prisoners,70 grounding

62. Survivor Testimony, JUST DET. INT’L, http://www.justdetention.org/en/survivor_
testimony.aspx (last visited March 21, 2013).
63. Attitudes, JUST DET. INT’L, http://www.justdetention.org/en/attitudes.aspx (last visited
March 21, 2013).
64. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that in 2011, there were 1,487,393 people in
corrections facilities designated for men, under state or federal authority, and 111,387 people in
facilities designated for women. See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SOBOL, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2011, 2 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
66. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 829-30, 837.
69. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions & the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 881, 892 (2009) (criticizing the Farmer standard because it “holds officers liable only for
those risks they happen to notice . . . .”).
70. See Nancy Levit, Male Prisoners: Privacy, Suffering, and the Legal Construction of
Masculinity, in PRISON MASCULINITIES 93, 93 (Don Sabo et al. eds., 2001).

5.SHAY.ARTICLE.MACRO.6.6.13 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

[ I N C LU DI NG BU T NO T LI MIT ED TO]

11/20/2013 12:37 PM

813

their Eighth Amendment analysis in evidence of women prisoners’ asserted
heightened vulnerabilities.71 A number of decisions have rejected due
process or privacy challenges to female officers’ supervision of male
prisoners.72 One opinion even doubted whether sexual abuse of male
prisoners constituted a “physical injury” within the meaning of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), thereby precluding survivors from
seeking money damages.73
Moreover, as Kim Buchanan has forcefully pointed out, anti-prison
sexual violence commentators and advocates themselves are not immune
from the power of our dominant, gendered rape narratives, sometimes
perpetuating these narratives even when they are not supported by
statistics.74 Buchanan argues that, despite the fact that data generated by
PREA directly counters some of our dominant narratives about the
gendered dynamics of rape, these notions remain resistant to change.75
Indeed, some provisions of the new PREA regulations—most notably the
provisions regarding cross-gender pat searches—were limited to women
prisoners and juveniles.76 The DOJ stated that it adopted different cross71. See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that
random, suspicionless, clothed-body pat searches of female prisoners by male guards violated the
Eighth Amendment, in part based on factual findings by the district court “that physical,
emotional and psychological differences between men and women ‘may well cause women, and
especially physically and sexually abused women, to react differently to searches of this type than
would male inmates subjected to similar searches by women.’”).
72. See Levit, supra note 70, at 93. See, e.g., Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 150-151 (7th
Cir. 1995) (rejecting a male pretrial detainee’s Fourth Amendment and due process challenges to
observation of naked male prisoners by women officers).
73. Hancock v. Payne, No. 1:03-CV-671, 2006 WL 21751, *1, 3* (S.D. Miss. Jan 4, 2006).
See Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and
Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PENN. J. CON. L. 139,
143-47 (2008) (discussing the PLRA physical injury requirement and the Hancock case).
74. Buchanan, supra note 22, at 1678 (noting that, despite the BJS statistics, “official and
academic commentators persist in characterizing nonforcible staff-on-inmate sex as ‘romantic’ or
harmless.”).
75. Id. at 1673 (“[W]hen researchers encounter surprising, counter-stereotypical results, their
explanations reveal interpretive tendencies that reconcile those results with stereotypical
expectations.”). Buchanan concludes her article: “The gaps and elisions of prison rape discourse
reveal the grip of unexamined gender and racial stereotypes on our understanding of prison rape
and of sexual abuse more generally. Prison realities demonstrate that, at least in some
circumstances, women may be more sexually aggressive, and men more sexually vulnerable, than
conventional gender expectations would predict.” Id. at 1688. See also Smith, supra note 11, at
1692 (“This Article seeks first and foremost to explain why the statistical evidence of abuse of
men and boys in custodial settings surprises reformers and disrupts perceived gender norms, and
to explain why female correctional workers have sex with men and boys in custody.”).
76. 28 C.F.R. § 115.15 (b) (2012) (providing that, by certain phased-in deadlines, “the
facility shall not permit cross-gender pat-down searches of female inmates, absent exigent
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gender pat search policies for women because corrections officials feared
charges of employment discrimination if they limited female officers’
duties in male facilities, and because of high reported rates of past abuse by
women prisoners.77 Certainly, these justifications can and will be subject to
continued debate.
Despite the continued influence of gendered expectations, the antiprison sexual violence movement has been shaped by male rape survivors
to a much greater extent than free-world anti-violence movements. The
more gender-inclusive approach of the movement that produced PREA may
be a precursor to further free-world trends, particularly more awareness of
LGBT victims.
We might ask what larger shifts are driving this transition to more
gender-inclusive anti-violence movements. Certainly, a weakening of
societal homophobia and growing LGBT rights movements are key
components of the new environment.78 Another powerful force might be
increased public attention to abuse of boys in scandals involving institutions
like Penn State,79 the Horace Mann School,80 and the Catholic Church.81
A common denominator to many of these developments, however, is
our changing conception of gender, and particularly a growing focus on the
construction of masculinities.82 Masculinities scholars such as Frank Rudy
Cooper and Jackson Katz have contributed to an increasing understanding
that gender is a “performance”;83 that male “gender violence” can victimize
circumstances.”). 28 C.F.R. § 115.315 (2012) (barring cross-gender pat-down, strip, and visual
body cavity searches of juveniles except in exigent circumstances).
77. National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, 77 Fed. Reg.
37,106, 37,133 (June 20, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115) (responding to comments on
cross-gender pat-down searches).
78. See LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY: THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION 324 (2012)
(arguing that the gay rights movement has largely met its goals).
79. Tim Rohan, Sandusky Gets 30 to 60 years for Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/sports/ncaafootball/penn-state-sandusky-is-sentenced-in-sexabuse-case.html?_r=0.
80. Amos Kamil, Prep-School Predators: The Horace Mann School’s Secret History of
Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/magazine/thehorace-mann-schools-secret-history-of-sexual-abuse.html?pagewanted=all.
81. Laurie Goodstein & Erik Eckholm, Church Battles Efforts to Ease Sex Abuse Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/us/sex-abuse-statutes-of-limitationstir-battle.html?pagewanted=all.
82. See Nancy E. Dowd et al., Feminist Legal Theory Meets Masculinities Theory, in
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 29 (Frank Rudy Cooper &
Ann C. McGinley, eds., 2012).
83. See Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops &
Police Training, 18 COL. J. GENDER & L. 671, 684 (2009) (writing that “the field of masculinities
studies presumes that men’s behavior is socially constructed” and that “our performances of our
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other men;84 and that men’s socially-constructed gender roles often mask
men’s very real vulnerabilities.85 Counter-intuitively, our attention to how
male gender roles contribute to male violence also may help us to conceive
of men as victims in certain contexts.86
An increasingly flexible conception of gender is not just an academic
trend, but a consciousness that increasingly informs popular and youth
culture—what the New York Times recently described as “Generation
LGBTQIA.”87 This attitudinal shift has encompassed a more frank
acknowledgment of the possibility of male victimization. For example, the
Columbia University “Take Back the Night” march, which previously had a
female-only space, went fully “gender-neutral” in 2012.88 One student
organizer explained, “Men can be survivors as well and it’s good to remind
everyone of that.”89
A question that others have posed and that bears further attention is
how anti-violence movements can adopt a more inclusive stance toward
male and same-sex victims, without producing yet more over-incarceration
of poor communities and communities of color.90 Feminist efforts to
reform rape and domestic violence law have been criticized by some for

gender constitute the very gender they are said to express.”); Video: Jackson Katz, Tough Guise:
Violence, Media & the Crisis in Masculinity (Susan Ericsson, Sanjay Talreja 2006) (on file with
author).
84. Harris, supra note 51, at 780.
85. Katz, supra note 83.
86. Dowd et al., supra note 82, at 29 (explaining that “some of that structuring [of
masculinity] creates a price, not a privilege; it creates harm, not benefit.”).
87. Michael Schulman, Generation LGBTQIA, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/10/fashion/generation-lgbtqia.html?pagewanted=all.
88. Abby Abrams Take Back the Night March Goes Gender-Neutral, COLUMBIA
SPECTATOR, March 29, 2012, http://www.columbiaspectator.com/2012/03/29/take-back-nightmarch-goes-gender-neutral.
89. Id.
90. See Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to “Straighten Out” Criminal
Law: What Might Happen When Queer Theory & Practice Meet Criminal Law’s Conventional
Response to Domestic Violence, 13 S.CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 81, 86 (2003) (advocating
responses to same-sex domestic violence that are not based solely on criminal law, and arguing
that “the better and more productive responses to same-sex domestic violence, which are primarily
the product of social service agencies and community-based organizations, are underpinned by
queer theory’s concepts of sexuality in general . . . .”). See also URVASHI VAID, IRRESISTIBLE
REVOLUTION: CONFRONTING RACE, CLASS AND THE ASSUMPTIONS OF LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER POLITICS 63 (2012) (Arguing that “reducing the overcriminalization of certain communities, sentencing reform, support for better treatment of
prisoners, working for an end to rape inside prison affect many LGBT people, and
disproportionately affect people of color.”).
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relying too much on state power and criminal punishment,91 a particular
concern in an era of unprecedented U.S. incarceration92 and a persistently
racially biased criminal punishment system.93 An increasing number of
commentators have called for anti-violence efforts that are more sensitive to
survivors’ autonomy,94 and rely less on our bloated incarceration system. 95
These important questions are beyond the scope of this brief symposium
contribution.
In this piece, I have highlighted some recent markers of our transition
to a more gender-inclusive notion of sexual assault and intimate partner
violence. The change to a more gender-inclusive approach will have many
implications for criminal justice policy and institutions, some of which
Professor Kelly Strader and I discussed in a book review that appeared last
year.96 One critical project is to ensure that courts and prosecutors adopt
competent and fair practices in cases involving same-sex intimate partner
and sexual violence.97 In future articles, I hope to look more closely at
various aspects of how these issues play out in our criminal prosecution
system. For today, let’s remember 2012 as a moment of transition in
movements against violence, now [including but not limited to] violence
against women.
91. See Gruber, supra note 28, at 653 (arguing that “feminists should disengage from rape
reforms that strengthen the penal state”); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 741, 763 (2007) (describing “the domestic violence reform movement’s transformation from
a grassroots progressive movement to an ally of conservative criminology.”); Emily J. Sack,
Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004
WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1675.
92. See Hope Metcalf, Foreword: When Words Fail: Confronting the Carceral State, 38
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1209, 1209 (2012) (discussing ramifications of the fact that 1 in 100
Americans is incarcerated, roughly 2.5 million people on any given day).
93. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, MASS INCARCERATION IN AN AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 4
(2010).
94. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 28, at 598 (calling for neo-feminist critiques of feminist law
reform efforts that “reject gender-crime law reform on the particular ground that it actually
disserves individual women and is damaging to the greater goals of feminism.”); LEIGH
GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & THE LEGAL SYSTEM 4 (2011)
(noting that “[t]he law is simply not a one size fits all situation.”); Leigh Goodmark, Reframing
Domestic Violence Law & Policy: An Anti-Essentialist Proposal, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39
(2009); Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
95. See Gruber, supra note 28, at 653; see also Harris, supra note 51, at 803-804.
96. Giovanna Shay & Kelly Strader, Book Review: QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: Mapping New Gay
(Scholarly) Agendas, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 171, 174-75 (2012).
97. See Todd Brower, Twelve Angry—and Sometimes Alienated—Men: The Experiences and
Treatment of Lesbians and Gay Men During Jury Service, 59, DRAKE L. REV. 669, 671 (2011)
(discussing issues of cultural competence towards gay people in one role in the courts).

